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ABSTRACT
How do European Union (EU) member states communicate risks to their citizens? In this study, we 
defi ne risk communication as the information provided by diff erent levels of government to citizens 
regarding possible future crises to which the general public might be subjected. We seek to answer 
the following questions: Are there any patterns in the risk communication strategies among EU 
member states in terms of the sender of information, the message conveyed, the method used, 
and the intended audience? Finally, to what extent is the state involved in ensuring the safety of 
its citizens? To tackle these questions, we examine the risk communication strategy of eight coun-
tries: Sweden, Finland, Germany, England, France, Estonia, Greece, and Cyprus. Our data consist of 
governmental web sites, publications, campaigns, and other modes of communication, such as 
videos posted on YouTube, with questions centering on institutional actors, methods of delivery, 
content, and eff ectiveness. We fi nd that the institutional architecture of risk communication aligns 
with the broad administrative system of each member state. Countries tend to focus on risks that 
are specifi c to their context, with Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Germany having a special focus 
on consequences and providing guidelines to the public on how to survive for a certain period 
of time in the absence of the state. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in risk 
communication through the dissemination of information at the agency level, the state retreats 
while urging the resilient citizen to take control of his or her own crisis management.
KEYWORDS: Risk communication; comparative studies; European politics; resilience; public 
policy
In May 2018, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) sent a 
pamphlet to all 4.7 million Swedish households containing information 
on how to deal with the consequences of contemporary emergencies, 
titled If Crisis or War Comes. This brochure was an updated version 
of a series of information sheets from World War II and the Cold War 
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era (Dwyer, 2018) and began with a message stating that even though 
Sweden was safer than many other countries, it faced threats that 
might jeopardize its security and independence (Myndigheten för 
samhällsskydd och beredskap, 2018).
Recent events with national repercussions for Sweden include the 
looming Russian geopolitical threat, the terrorist attack in central 
Stockholm in April 2017, the forest fires in Västmanland of 2014 (see 
Öhman, Giritli Nygren, & Olofsson, 2016), and the extensive forest 
fires in summer 2018. The cultural imagination of realized disasters 
and many other chimerical ones influences the response to current 
challenges. The “emergency imaginary” dictates the perception of di-
sasters among professionals (Gregersen & Winkel Holm, n.d.), and in 
turn, this perception determines what risks professionals communicate 
to the public and how they do so. More specifically, Calhoun (2008) 
theorized that framing events as emergencies shapes the way in which 
we understand aberrant (perhaps) events, such as inter alia crises, 
disasters, and international conflicts, and delineates the range of ac-
ceptable actions. The emergency imaginary is a way of conceptualizing 
problematic events, foregrounding their “unpredictability, abnormality, 
and brevity” while concomitantly pointing to their attendant corollary: 
intervention (Calhoun, 2008, p. 375). Calhoun treated the issue of inter-
national emergencies and humanitarian intervention, but theoretically, 
we can scale down and consider problematic events at the micro level 
and what intervention at the individual level might look like.
Calhoun (2008) also noted that attention must be paid to the ways 
risks and threats are conceptualized so that we may understand “the 
social organization of fear” (p. 381), on one hand, and, on the other, 
how the sense of vulnerability is distributed. This is not a new concept 
in risk communication research, and in this study, we consider risk 
communication specifically at the preparedness phase, which
is designed to understand and address the public’s awareness and 
knowledge gaps related to risk events, to elicit desired preparedness 
behaviors through identifying and utilizing effective communication 
channels, to ensure adequate understanding, and to educate about what 
actions to take when messages are issued. (Sheppard, Janoske, & Liu, 
2012, p. 11; see also Leiss, 1996; Lofstedt, 2010)
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The empirical impetus for this research was the striking catholic and 
centralized nature of the aforementioned communiqué issued by the 
Swedish state. Our study aims at filling the apparent lacuna of cross-
country European comparisons when it comes to risk communication 
at the preparedness phase (see, however, Infanti et al., 2013; Lofstedt, 
2010; Tourenq, Boustras, & Gutteling, 2017 for a set of guidelines). From 
a theoretical perspective, we seek to uncover the architecture (actors, 
institutions, and the degree of their involvement, message, method, 
and audience) as part of the risk communication process. In other 
words, our research question is as follows: How is this imaginary of 
emergencies in Europe reflected in the content of risk communication 
messages issued by governmental organizations?
To answer this question, we conducted a comparative study of eight 
European Union (EU) member states with the objective to map the 
institutional risk communication structure, the messages that these 
actors send, how these messages are conveyed, and to whom.
Literature Review
Risk communication as a research area is broad and diversified, includ-
ing areas such as risk perception, risk and emotions, social construc-
tion of risk, media communication, framing, social movements, public 
engagement, and, not least, crisis communication (Cho, Reimer, & Mc-
Comas, 2006; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). Therefore, whenever we 
study “risk communication,” we need to define our object of inquiry and 
thus delimit our investigation. In this article, we investigated national 
and subnational risk communication and more specifically the way 
different European countries have designed their risk communication 
architecture regarding possible future crises where the receiver is the 
public at large.
Empirically and theoretically focused research has targeted the 
receivers’ information seeking (Alaszewski, 2005), perception of risk 
communication tools and messages (Slovic, 1999), trust in commu-
nicators (Renn & Levine, 1991), vulnerabilities (Fothergill, Maestas, 
& Darlington, 1999), and sociocultural contexts (Wardman, 2014). 
Although such research has produced insight and guidelines regarding 
these different core aspects of risk communication, relatively few studies 
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have focused on public policy, particularly in a comparative perspective. 
Two exceptions are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report Trends in Risk Communication Policies and 
Practices from 2016, which reviewed the risk communication systems 
of 19 countries, and the 2017 study authored by Tourenq, Boustras, and 
Gutteling that compared the policy design of Cyprus, France, and the 
Netherlands (see also Infanti et al.’s 2013 literature review on effective 
risk communication in Europe). Reflecting the risk communication 
literature, the OECD (2016) defined six criteria for effective risk com-
munication:
• Consistency across different risk communication tools.
• Two-way communication and interactive approaches.
• Accuracy and trust. Best available knowledge should be used 
in a transparent way.
• Accessibility of information for citizens, NGOs (non-govern-
mental organizations) and private organizations to seek and use.
• Information adapted to the audience’s cognitive capacities, their 
exposure or vulnerability.
• Cross-sectoral and trans-boundary, reflecting the cross-border, 
multiple dimensions and possible cascading effects of threats 
and hazards. (p. 30)
The report illustrates how risk communication systems may be un-
derstood and evaluated based on these criteria and the state of the art 
(e.g., Hampel, 2006; Leiss, 1996; Renn & Levine, 1991; Ulmer et al., 
2011). See Table 1.
The conclusions of the report partly indicate that national risk com-
munication needs to be more inclusive and interactive and to focus more 
on prevention, that is, provide more information about what people can 
do to mitigate their exposure to risk. Tourenq, Boustras, and Gutteling 
(2017) argued similarly in a comparative study of Cyprus, France, and 
the Netherlands. They evaluated available information on the coun-
tries’ websites based on the assumption that two-way communication 
enhances individual preparedness and resilience. They found that both 
France and the Netherlands had interactive communication and that 
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the Netherlands particularly focused on the individual citizen’s ability 
not only to manage but also to prepare for crises. The risk communica-
tion of Cyprus, conversely, was exclusively one way, providing expert 
information for the purpose of “educating people” (Tourenq et al., 
2017, p. 547). Arguably, there exist two different assumptions on which 
risk communication architecture is based: the “educate the public” ap-
proach, where citizens are seen as passive and unknowledgeable, and 
the “resilient citizen” approach, where citizens are not only active and 
knowledgeable but also seeking responsibility for themselves and the 
community (see Aradau, 2014).
This leads us to the orientation of this article, which is a critical 
perspective of risk and risk communication as constituent components 
of the imaginary of emergencies (Boisseau, Feltey, Flynn, Gelfand, & 
Triece, 2008; Calhoun, 2008). Risk and its communication create a 
demand for changes to society and to individuals: Risk may be viewed 
as a concept intent on exercising power (Wilkinson, 2009). The notion 
of risk can thus serve as a control technique expressing the interaction 
TABLE 1 Core Elements of a National Risk Communication System
Element Description
Governance Who is in charge of risk communication, and what is the 
institutional structure of risk communication governance?
Considering all hazards and 
forward thinking
How comprehensive and forward oriented are national risk 
communication practices?
Purpose of communication 
and activation of target 
audience
What is the purpose of countries’ risk communication, 
and how is the target audience involved to effectively 
communicate risk?
Focus on prevention How prevention focused are national risk communication 
practices?
Tapping into innovation What is the role of innovative technologies in countries’ 
risk communication practices?
Evaluation What is the effect of risk communication, and how is it 
being measured?
Note. Based on OECD (2016).
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of power relationships (Hannah-Moffat & O’Malley, 2007). This opens 
up for questions of how notions of risk come to “delimit what it is 
possible to think and say at a particular time, what purpose does this 
serve, and to whose benefit?” (Wardman, 2008, p. 1633), or as Calhoun 
(2008, p. 381) put it, how the conceptualization of risk impacts on the 
social organization of fear. In some cases, inequalities are (re)produced 
by modes of governance, including the use of “risk” as a regulatory 
regime that is shaped by power imbalances (Giritli Nygren, Öhman, & 
Olofsson, 2017; Montelius & Giritli Nygren, 2014). Risk communication 
often aims at supporting vulnerable populations, but by making the 
power dimension of risk communication and its intersection with other 
lines of power visible, we allow for an analysis of risk communication 
practices that does not hide the reproduction of existing norms and 
social inequality.
For this reason, we pay special attention to the issue of representative-
ness. The audience of risk communication consists of diverse publics, 
necessitating a certain tailoring of the message to establish trust and 
collaboration (Janoske, Liu, & Sheppard, 2012). Janoske et al. reported 
on children, the elderly and disabled, and racial and ethnic minorities. 
We considered risk communication aimed at transient populations as 
well as people living in rural areas in our study in an effort to broaden 
the diversity of publics under consideration.
In summary, there is a paucity of cross-country comparative research 
examining such issues as risk communication policies, institutional ac-
tors, the intended recipient and message content, and even fewer with 
a critical component. The extant international comparisons, though 
they provide an important starting point for thinking about risk com-
munication in comparative terms, do not go far enough in addressing 
the imaginary of emergencies in Europe and nuances among coun-
tries under investigation. For example, Tourenq et al. (2017) men-
tioned factors such as “history, people, management, and lack of funds” 
(pp. 546–547) but do not go any further. This article adds to the limited 
knowledge of risk communication at the national and subnational 
levels (Infanti et al., 2013) but also expands the analysis with a systematic 
comparison among EU countries. Such comparison has a number of 
practical implications. Different countries often face not only similar 
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risks but also risks that stretch over national boundaries. The insight 
into how countries perceive and communicate risk and prepare for 
crises has the potential to facilitate coordination in the face of an 
extraordinary event. A recent example of a European civil protection 
mobilization took place in summer 2018 when the coordinated effort 
of eight countries assisted Sweden in battling destructive forest fires 
(European Commission, 2018).
Research Design, Method, and Data
This is a qualitative systematic comparison aiming at capturing as much 
variation as possible among EU member states. To fulfill the objective 
of maximum variation in the cases selected, the logic of comparison is a 
variation of the “most different systems” logic, which is a logic of sys-
tematic cross-country comparison first articulated by Przeworski and 
Teune (1970; see also Collier, 1993; Meckstroth, 1975). Rather than un-
covering causal relationships, the eight-country comparison contrasted 
contexts to establish a framework for understanding how risk communi-
cation processes play out in different ways in each context. This interpre-
tive dimension in social sciences is accommodated within small N com-
parative studies as elaborated in Skocpol and Somers (1980). The authors 
posited that asking the same or similar analytical questions in contrast-
ing contexts may highlight divergences, making them more transpar-
ent—though this is not a causal analysis producing sweeping theory.
To that end, the selection of cases covered the entire geographic 
gamut of the EU 28. Geography is relevant because it partly (though 
not exclusively) determines what kind of events might be conceived as 
threats by each country. Additionally, geography functions as a kind 
of proxy for the historical contingences idiosyncratic to each country. 
Traditionally, Greece and Cyprus belong to the European South; France 
and Germany are in Western Europe (though Germany is sometimes 
classified as Central) and Sweden and Finland belong to Northern 
Europe, while Estonia is part of Eastern Europe. The British Isles here 
are considered a part of Western Europe,1 though elsewhere they may 
be classified as a region of their own (Libraries of the University of 
Minnesota, 2012).
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Additionally, the countries under examination covered the entire 
typology range of public administration systems in Europe (Kuhlmann 
& Wollmann, 2014). This is relevant because risk communication is 
part of the public administration arrangements of each case in terms of 
institutions involved, message conveyed, and so on. France and Greece 
belong to the Continental European Napoleonic model, characterized 
by a strong centralized government and a powerful centralized bureau-
cracy, which means that the subnational and local levels are considered 
to be subordinate. In contrast, in the Continental European Federal 
model (Germany), the central bureaucracy is weaker, and the subna-
tional, decentralized institutions have more power. In the Scandinavian 
model (Sweden, Finland), the administrative structure is also highly 
TABLE 2 Thematic Guide for Data Analysis
Category Constituent questions
Institutional actors What institutional actors are involved in the risk 
communication process?
Are there any nongovernmental organizations involved, 
and if so, how?
Method How is the message communicated to the public?
Is the communication in any language other than the 
official language for each country investigated? If that is the 
case, is the message the same?
Are there any provisions to spread the message to 
subgroups of the population, such as (a) people with 
disabilities, (b) nonnative speakers (tourists or immigrants), 
(c) people in elderly care, (d) the homeless.
What kinds of media (videos, pictures, text) are used to 
convey the message?
Content What kinds of risks and potential crises do the countries 
under comparison take up?
Are there any campaigns (with or without a timeline) 
geared toward raising public awareness when it comes to 
crisis preparedness? If so, what do these campaigns look 
like?
Effectiveness Have there been any evaluations assessing the effectiveness 
of the risk communication tools? 
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decentralized, while the most salient feature of the Anglo-Saxon model 
(England and, to a certain extent, Cyprus) is new public management 
decentralized managerial practices (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014). In 
Estonia, we capture the postcommunist environment with the attendant 
interventionist state.
Our investigation was conducted on publicly available text and im-
ages (still and video) comprising risk communication material at the 
preparedness phase. Data included information about risks, warnings, 
self-protection guidelines, and other publications geared toward various 
publics on outlets (official websites, YouTube channels, and Facebook 
groups) authored and curated by public entities of, or related to, civil 
protection or civil defense. We, the authors, have native or near-native 
linguistic competence as well as country-specific knowledge of the 
countries we compared. This eliminated any linguistic or cultural mis-
understandings and allowed for a nuanced analysis of texts and images. 
We asked the same questions of the data, thematically arranged and 
summarized in Table 2. We used these questions to address the core 
elements of a national risk communication system (see Table 1) and, 
in turn, unpack the imaginary of emergencies.
Results
In this section, we present the results of the data analysis based on 
the thematic guide presented in Table 2. The purpose of the analysis 
is to understand how the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008) 
is reflected in the risk communication practices of the eight selected 
countries by fleshing out any convergent as well as divergent points 
among them, structured after the items in Table 1.
Governance Arrangements: Who Is in Charge of Risk 
Communication?
The degree of the centralization of responsibility for risk communica-
tion varies among the countries under comparison, generally along the 
lines of their administrative system. The institutional risk communica-
tion architecture in the Scandinavian countries follows the corporatist 
model with civil society and the local level being important actors and 
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builds on collaboration among agencies and municipalities as well as 
the involvement of private and volunteer sectors. The Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB), placed under the Ministry of Justice, and 
the Finnish department for Rescue Services have strategic, coordinat-
ing, and supportive responsibilities. More specifically, the Swedish MSB 
provides information to the public mainly through two websites (http://
www.dinsakerket.se/ and http://www.krisinformation.se/), though the 
websites of county administrative boards and municipalities also convey 
information to the public. The Finnish Rescue Services are responsible 
for preventing accidents, providing emergency services, and protecting 
the population in exceptional circumstances at the regional level and are 
also responsible for civil defense (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
Conversely, France and Greece, in Western and Southern Europe, 
respectively, follow the continental Napoleonic model, and unsurpris-
ingly, the national government is in charge of what is communicated 
and how. In France, the General Secretariat for Defense and National 
Security (SGDSN) in the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the na-
tional plans that serve as decision support tools at the national level. 
The secretariat supports the prime minister and the president in their 
role as crisis managers and is also responsible for civil defense (Gou-
vernement Français, 2018a). Similarly, in Greece, civil protection issues 
are handled by the General Secretariat for Civil Protection established 
in 1995 and tasked with coordinating risk communication to citizens 
both in general terms and during exceptional circumstances (Republic 
of Greece, 2002).
The Estonian Rescue Board, the third largest public service institu-
tion in Estonia, is the main actor in risk communication (Päästeamet, 
2017), whereas in England, the substance and method of delivery of 
risk communication are the responsibility of Local Resilience Forums. 
These are not legal entities but “collaborative mechanisms” that “have a 
collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-
agency environment” (Cabinet Office, 2013, p. 3). Most of these follow 
police force boundaries (Garton Grimwood, 2017). The organization 
with leading responsibilities in emergency management is the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, established in 2001 
(Cabinet Office, 2013).
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In Germany, the institution responsible for informing the public 
of risks and potential crises is the German Federal Office of Civil Pro-
tection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz 
und Katastrophenhilfe; BBK) under the German Interior Ministry 
(BMI), which is the highest federal authority. The main purpose of 
the BBK is to prepare the public for times of crisis; coordinate all the 
bodies involved before, during, and after a crisis; and provide the 
physical and psychological support necessary for citizens’ well-being 
(Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe [BBK], 
2018a, 2018b). Municipalities are active in civil defense (Zivilschutz- und 
Katastrophenhilfegesetz, 1997/2009, para. 5/1), and they use informa-
tion available on the BBK website. Additionally, a host of voluntary 
organizations is actively involved in communicating information to 
the public.
This is not the case in Cyprus, where for one to be a volunteer, one 
must be a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus and register by submitting 
an online form. Strategic policy decisions are made by the General Civil 
Defense Administration, while there are also five district administra-
tions (Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018a). The Civil Defense Force 
has the added responsibility to protect citizens in periods of hostilities 
(Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018b).
Which Hazards Are Communicated, and to What Extent Is 
the Focus on Prevention?
Greece, Estonia, Cyprus, and France focus on various known risks 
and hazards—such as earthquakes; inclement weather; landslides; and 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats—with 
a focus on those threats specific to each country. For example, Greece 
places a particular emphasis on forest fires, which occur annually and 
to a certain extent are due to either human error or arson, but there is 
no mention of the threat of terrorist attack or hostilities. The current 
geopolitical alignment of Greece and its self-reference as an interstice 
between East and West may exclude the imaginary of a space for terror-
ist attacks of the kind similar to those elsewhere in Europe. However, 
emphasis is put on home fires as, due to the economic crisis, people 
have started using braziers and burning various materials in their 
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fireplaces. There is a marked focus on prevention of these well-defined 
risks (General Secretariat for Civil Protection, 2018).
In Estonia in 2016, a spatial analysis of home fires showed a correla-
tion with socioeconomic factors. In Tallinn, for example, home fires 
occur more often in residential buildings from the Soviet era, where 
inhabitants in general are older, have lower income, and live alone 
and where Estonian is not their first language. In a departure from the 
other countries under comparison in this study, the Estonian Rescue 
Board conducts home visits during which they advise residents on 
how to make their home safer. In 2016, the board carried out more 
than 17,000 home consultations, covering 2.7% of Estonian house-
holds. It also organizes safety awareness days and regular school visits 
(Päästeamet, 2017).
France covers a broader array of risks with a number of sectoral 
plans (national and territorial), each corresponding to a previously 
identified risk or threat. A set of complementary plans, Plan Vigipirate 
(the Pirate Family), specifically addresses the capacity of the state and 
relevant stakeholders to deal with terrorist attacks (Gouvernement Fran-
çais, 2018b). At the national website, there is a specific section on risk 
prevention (Gourvernment Français, 2018c). Under the slogan “Better 
prepared, better informed, you will be able to act in case of problems 
and help your loved ones in the face of an emergency,” video tutorials 
address a number of risks. The Ministry of Interior Affairs’s website 
contains a section about personal security (“Ma sécurité”) where citizens 
can learn how to avoid accidents inside and outside the home with a 
special section for the elderly (French Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
The Civil Defense Force in Cyprus takes up the same risks as Greece 
with additional information on what to do in the event of hostile ac-
tion (the Greek word ehthropraxía [εχθροπραξία] conveys “act of war” 
rather than “terrorist attack”), including the case of a bombing cam-
paign by another nation and fires caused by such action. The message 
is unequivocal: “Self-protection is basically the responsibility of all of 
us. Take the necessary measures in good time” (Civil Defense Force, 
2002, n.p.).
While this quote stems from the threat of invasion in Cyprus, the 
Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum has a similar message on 
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its website: “Whilst we can’t prevent emergencies happening, we can 
plan ahead to minimise the impact” (Greater Manchester Prepared, 
2018, n.p.), admitting that the state is unable to keep the citizenry safe 
through prevention measures and that safety is the responsibility of 
the individual. In addition to England, risk communication strategies 
in Sweden and Germany are characterized by an all-hazards approach 
that focuses on consequences and the open admission that risks can-
not be prevented.
Both Sweden and Germany have incorporated preparedness cam-
paigns in their risk communication strategies, in which the public is 
urged to have a store of supplies at hand to survive a certain period of 
time during which a complete disruption of societal functions is imag-
ined, including loss of electricity, water, means of transportation, and 
any other amenity that one takes for granted in an advanced Western 
democracy. The German BKK’s website recommends storing enough 
food and water to survive for at least 2 weeks in the worst-case scenario 
(BBK, 2017, p.10), though conflicting guidelines from the Ministry of 
the Interior advising 5 days’ worth of water supplies and 10 days’ worth 
of food created confusion among the citizens (Bundesministerium des 
Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2016).
In Sweden, to raise public awareness, MSB ran a weeklong cam-
paign on May 8, 2017, titled “Upside Down” (Upp och Ner). This was 
the second such MSB-led campaign, and its target group was women 
between 45 and 64 years of age. The campaign centered on disruption 
in electricity supply and focused on the necessities each household 
ought to have to be able to function during a days-long blackout. This 
campaign essentially reinforced the earlier message communicated 
on the websites of Swedish municipalities and county administrative 
boards: “this is what you need to have at home during a crisis” (detta 
behöver du ha hemma vid en kris).
In Finland, a very different 72-hour campaign mainly consisted of 
meetings between nongovernmental organization (NGO) representa-
tives and the public. The campaign was partly carried out online, but 
the main focus was on face-to-face workshops. Apart from the official 
72-hour website (http://www.72tuntia.fi/), which is available in Finn-
ish, Swedish, and English, several organizations, for example, Suomen 
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Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö (the Finnish National Rescue Associa-
tion; SPEK), also distributed printed information about the 72-hour 
campaign. Notably, SPEK, which is a national consultancy and service 
organization for fire and rescue services responsible for training NGO 
workers, has used MSB YouTube videos in their training material in 
the Swedish speaking areas of Finland. Whereas the 72-hour campaign 
is mainly geared toward the urban population, SPEK also maintains 
a project called “Our Safe Village” that is geared toward small-town 
preparedness for everyday disruptions and accidents (Suomen Pelas-
tusalan Keskusjärjestö, 2018).
Tap Into Innovation: The Use of Technology in Risk 
Communication
With the exception of Cyprus, all countries use YouTube to post TV 
spots and educational films. They also use Facebook and Twitter as 
information dissemination tools. Sweden, England, France, and Ger-
many have launched smartphone applications varying in scope and 
interactivity. For example, the French government describes the aims 
of the app (called SAIP) as follows: “It is part of an approach to de-
velop a culture of vigilance and security of our citizens, initiated with 
the awareness campaign ‘React in case of terrorist attack’ which gives 
practical instructions based on: ‘escape, hide, alert’”(Gouvernement 
Français, 2018d, n.p.).
Conversely, the German app NINA aims at informing the public 
about current weather situations; national, regional, and local threats; 
and, in particular, large-scale emergencies (Großschadenslagen). The 
dissemination of local-specific information is limited due to the service 
availability (BBK, 2018c).
Know Your Impact
It is unclear whether the countries under comparison know the impact 
of their risk communication strategies. Though the institutional ac-
tors involved have the mandate to evaluate (e.g., Republic of Greece, 
2002), no evaluations of risk communication strategies are available on 
governmental websites. Estonia, however, is an exception to this: The 
Estonian Rescue Board seeks public feedback to measure satisfaction 
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and trust in the board’s operations. Feedback was gathered after rescue 
events, home consultations, training sessions, safety days, and construc-
tion site inspections (Päästeamet, 2017).
Communicate—to Whom?
Most countries convey some information in English, though the English 
version lacks in depth and detail. The “easy language” versions of the 
Swedish and German websites are also limited. Where the automated 
translation function of Google is used, the results can range from con-
fusing to amusing. At the two sides of the continuum are Greece, with 
information in six professionally translated languages, and Cyprus and 
England, with information only in Greek and English, respectively.
The image of society that comes across by the risk communication 
content and techniques is fairly traditional in terms of family structures, 
households, and people. For example, images of people with obvious 
disabilities are few and far between.
Generally speaking, spatial images are generic, though the environ-
ment is implicitly urban. This is deduced not by what is said but rather 
by what is left unsaid. For example, there is no information specific to 
the countryside. Exceptions to these are the “Safe Village” campaign 
in Finland and the information from the English Local Resilience 
Forums, because the latter are very localized and the information fits 
the local context.
Communicate—for What Purpose, and What Is the Role of 
the Recipient?
All eight EU countries, to various degrees, advise the public on how to 
prepare, act, and protect themselves and others during events ranging 
from inclement weather to acts of war by providing specific information 
on these risks. We did not find any instances of explicitly interactive 
communication. Even in countries in which there exist smartphone 
apps, the information seems to be flowing one way. Having said this, 
the content of information seems to activate the recipients: They are 
urged to have a family contingency plan, to actively protect their homes 
from fires, and to be vigilant and inform if they see suspicious objects 
left unattended in public spaces.
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As mentioned elsewhere in this article, Sweden and, to a certain 
extent, Germany have incorporated a specific kind of campaign in their 
risk communication strategies, a campaign focused on consequences 
rather than risks that urges the public to have supplies to last them 
for some time in case of complete societal breakdown due to a mostly 
unspecified—and largely irrelevant to the substance of the communi-
cation—risk. Sweden alone is sending this information in print form 
to all the households in the country.
This focus on the consequences of an unspecified catastrophic event 
has had the unforeseen effect of commodifying risk in Sweden. The 
emphasis on materiality has created a marketplace for the products 
that the state recommends be in every household storage space, such 
as canned water.
We argue that this is a case of the citizen being nudged into a per-
ceived resilient state by the admission of the public sector that it will be 
unavailable at the onset of an unspecified extreme event. Additionally, 
this is a rather static idea of resilience, as the focus is on the materiality 
of preparedness rather than social relations and making sure that one’s 
neighbor is safe as well. This discourse echoes the U.S. Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA), which shifts the responsibility of 
emergency management from the federal to the state, local, community, 
and individual levels (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018).
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The eight countries under comparison cover the gamut of geographies 
and administrative systems. Moreover, two pairs of countries—Greece 
and Cyprus and, to a certain extent, Finland and Sweden—share a 
common language and the culture and heritage that are embedded in 
language. One would expect similarities in the way the imaginary of 
emergencies is reflected in the risk communication policies of Greece 
and Cyprus, both part of the European South but with different admin-
istrative systems, but that is not the case. Finland runs a campaign with 
the same title as Sweden’s, shares the same message, and uses material 
from MSB in their information tool kit in the Swedish-speaking parts 
of the country. However, the focus is on training volunteer personnel 
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and not blanket information dissemination to the public. There are 
also two countries that share a (post)colonial relationship—the United 
Kingdom and Cyprus. While the United Kingdom and Cyprus share 
the same administrative system to some extent, a vestige from an earlier 
colonial relationship, Cyprus is alone in the degree of militarization 
of civil defense, and the United Kingdom is the foremost country ar-
ranging its risk communication structure under the term resilience. 
The factor overriding a common heritage (with Greece) or a common 
administrative system (with the United Kingdom) is previous experi-
ence with an extraordinary event, and Cyprus has had a very recent 
experience of military action.
The pattern of institutional structures that organizes risk com-
munication in all the countries under investigation aligns with their 
administrative systems. The institution that deals with risk commu-
nication is a variation of a civil protection entity normally under the 
ministry of the interior, though in the United Kingdom, the central 
institution is in the Cabinet Office. Incidentally, this is the equivalent 
of the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, where the Secretariat for Crisis 
Management was placed when it was first created in Sweden in 2007 
(Petridou & Sparf, 2017). Sweden and the United Kingdom use the 
term civil contingencies, whereas Finland, Cyprus, and Estonia use the 
term civil defense. The remaining countries use civil protection. There 
is a marked military component in the Cypriot structure, but perhaps 
this is unsurprising given that its capital is the only remaining divided 
capital in the world. There are military echoes in Finland and Estonia 
as well, which is again perhaps unsurprising given their historical 
contingencies and recent geopolitical events.
The pattern of central control with decentralized input holds more or 
less in all countries, including the federal Germany. The U.K. system is 
very different, however, where the central level has only strategic func-
tions and all the risk communication competencies have been devolved 
to the regional level in what are called Local Resilience Forums. This 
makes for a lack of uniformity in information that is communicated to 
the public, as each resilience forum is region specific. At the same time, 
the public receives information relevant to them and not a generic ver-
sion of risk communication. In the other countries under comparison, 
224 petridou, danielsson, olofsson, et al.
information is reproduced at the subnational level from the national 
website, which can make for a “one-size-fits-all” information packet 
missing local nuances, such as center–periphery issues. In France, 
there is a marked fragmentation of information disseminated to the 
public with several ministries being involved in the process. Notably, 
this fragmentation is at the national level, as the responsibility for 
risk communication rests with the national government. Conversely, 
in Greece, for example, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat informs 
citizens of risks, including risks that are corollaries of adverse weather, 
whereas in France, the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition 
informs on these risks.
Volunteer organizations are present in all the countries in question, 
though not to the same degree. This ranges from a controlled registra-
tion system in Cyprus to very active involvement in Finland to a separate 
volunteer organization coordination entity in the United Kingdom. 
Other than Germany and Finland, in which volunteer organizations 
provide risk communication, in most of the countries in question, 
the communication is handled by government at various levels. For 
example, in Germany, crisis management rests heavily on the engage-
ment of volunteers in local organizations such as fire brigades and 
rescue services. These local organizations communicate information 
about risks related to their area of responsibility (e.g., fire) and how to 
become a member and participate in crisis management.
Websites are the foremost vehicle for communicating information to 
the public, though in Sweden, France, England, and Germany (notably, 
in the more economically developed Northern and Western Europe), the 
national government also employs apps as early warning systems. The 
authorities also use social media to disseminate information: Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube, though the extent varies among the countries 
under comparison. In Estonia, the public sector conducts home visits 
to disseminate self-protection guidelines, a possible vestige of an era 
of an omnipresent state. The range of state involvement in the amount 
and scope of information communicated is quite broad, ranging from 
the aforementioned home visits to rather sparse information from the 
Civil Defense Force in Cyprus, where the only videos found on YouTube 
were recordings of military parades.
If Crisis or War Comes 225
Notably, the strategic risk communication policy gaze of the United 
Kingdom and Sweden seems to be fixed westward toward the United 
States in terms of devolution and a responsibilitization of the individual, 
respectively. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in 
risk communication through the dissemination of information at the 
agency level, the state retreats while nudging at the resilient citizen, 
urging him or her to take control of his or her own crisis management.
Finally, the comparison revealed that though there are similarities 
in the way the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008) is reflected 
in risk communication policies in EU countries, there are also major 
differences. With the exception of governance arrangements, which 
follow each country’s administrative system, we did not find stable 
patterns connecting political administrative systems and geography to 
the risk communication policy of all the countries under consideration. 
The study, however, allowed us to tease out and showcase factors of 
risk communication policy by comparing and contrasting across eight 
European contexts.
Having said this, we argue that more knowledge is needed regarding 
the effects of campaigns and risk communication activities directed 
toward the various publics, both in terms of these publics’ understand-
ing, knowledge, and preparedness and in terms of possible differences 
between their diverse resources to respond. Furthermore, there is a 
need for better understanding of the motives behind the various ap-
proaches that different countries apply. Our European comparison shed 
some light on the national-level processes, but more cross-country 
comparisons within Europe and beyond are needed to position our 
results in a global context. In addition to breadth, we also advocate 
depth. There is a need for comparative field research and interviews 
with the institutional actors and publics involved in the communication 
process to understand the construction of the imaginary of emergen-
cies in different national contexts. Finally, it would be beneficial for 
researchers and policy makers alike to understand the diffusion of risk 
communication policies and the national environments that ideation-
ally influence the policy process.
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No information was collected regarding practices in the so-called Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, an entity recognized solely by Turkey.
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